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The voluntary carbon market (VCM) is a relatively mature field where institutions have become firmly 
established. This empirical paper explores findings obtained from interviewing key actors within the VCM in 
New Zealand, at a time when the organizational field was beginning to emerge (2010/2011). Fourteen semi-
structured interviews were carried out with managers and decision-makers at thirteen organizations, representing 
a cross-section of leaders in the field at the time. Participants were investigated regarding their cognitions as well 
as their operational activities and interactions with the range of actors in the field, and how these evolved over 
time. Case studies of the wine industry, the taxi industry, and the carbon service industry are presented. Findings 
identify a number of early successes, including endeavors which focused on promoting market integrity through 
infrastructure and knowledge sharing amongst participants, which influenced others to shift behavior around 
climate change mitigation in general. Setbacks are evident as well, with the primary setback characterized as 
market stagnation: buyers and sellers drifting away from the market. Communication challenges, low certification 
recognition, risk of greenwash exposure, policy uncertainty, the global financial crisis, and general 
disenchantment with the carbon market were listed as some of the causes.  
 
Keywords: Organization behavior, carbon service industry, institutional frameworks, carbon management 
strategies, carbon offsetting 
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Introduction 
 Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) are increasing as a result of the 
burning of fossil fuels (e.g. Hansen, Sato and Ruedy 2012). This destabilization of the Earth’s 
climate system has resulted in an increase in global average temperatures and will lead to more 
extreme weather events and sea-level rise (IPCC 2013), with potentially disastrous ecological and 
societal consequences. Finding a solution to climate change has taken centre stage in international 
policy discussions. The mitigation strategy upon which much of the international governmental 
policy focus currently lies is the use of carbon markets (e.g. Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013; Lo 
2016). Indeed, given the decentralized and global nature of markets (e.g. Backstrand and 
Lovbrand, 2006), it has the potential to compel emission reductions in an economically efficient 
manner. Unlike the sulphur dioxide market, however, which is held up as a model of market 
effectiveness to solve an environmental problem (Burtraw and Palmer 2004), GHG emissions are 
a global problem deeply embedded with economic success and produced by a wide variety of 
actors. It is thus particularly challenging to implement an effective scheme that is equitable for all 
countries and all sectors. As a result, carbon markets are emerging in all shapes and sizes: 
international, national and regional, voluntary and compliance, sector specific and multi-sector 
spanning. 
 
 Emerging in tandem with a focus on carbon trading are the concepts of ‘carbon neutrality’ 
and ‘offsetting.’ Offsetting, where released carbon emissions in one place are counter-balanced by 
the purchase of emission reductions or sequestration elsewhere, is an integral part of carbon 
markets, both voluntary and compliance based, and a body of academic work has grown around 
this field (e.g. Lovell and Ghaleigh 2013; Balderas Torres, MacMillan, Skutsch and Lovett 2015). 
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Arising in conjunction with the concept of offsets is the controversial notion of carbon neutrality. 
At its best, carbon neutrality implies that emissions are measured, reduced in so far as is considered 
practical, and the remaining ‘unavoidable’ emissions are offset (WBCSD/ WRI 2004).  
 
 Both concepts have sparked academic interest and controversy (e.g. Lovell and Liverman 
2010; Milne and Grubnic 2011; Birchall, Ball, Mason and Milne 2013). Critics caution the 
potential of carbon offsetting to perpetuate a business as usual mentality (e.g. Dhanda and Hartman 
2011; Harding and Rapson 2014), where the purchase of offsets may be preferred over emissions 
reductions. The efficacy of offsetting itself has been challenged (e.g. Spash 2010), and concern 
surrounds the effectiveness of offsets to reduce GHG emissions (e.g. Ziegler and Schwirplies 
2014).  
 
 A number of studies have explored behavior around willingness to pay for carbon offsetting 
(e.g. Schwirplies and Ziegler 2016; Segerstedt and Grote 2016), the value of certified versus non-
certified carbon offset programs (e.g. Mackerron Egerton, Gaskell, Parpia and Mourato 2009), and 
legitimacy of carbon certification standards in general (e.g. de la Plaza Esteban, Visseren-
Hamakers and de Jong 2014). 
 
 Nevertheless, a service industry of certifiers, auditors and consultants has emerged to 
provide the market with the necessary ‘social infrastructure’ (Voß 2007), and proactive 
organizations are exploring management strategies and action plans for emissions reductions (e.g. 
Bebbington and Barter 2011; Lee 2012; Wade, Dargusch and Griffiths 2014).  
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 Organizations face obvious tensions and paradoxical motives between their desires to 
strategically manage and reduce ecological impacts and desires to grow and succeed economically 
(e.g. Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). While organizations aim to distinguish themselves 
from rivals, they also seek to manage reputational interdependence, where others’ actions affect 
the perception of the entire field (Hargrave 2008). This contagion effect or reputational spill (Yu 
and Lester 2008) can drive keen organizations to leverage their innovative capacity and standout 
in an emerging field (Pinkse and Kolk 2010). 
 
 Stakeholder pressure and competitive considerations have been shown to be primary 
drivers shaping business strategies (e.g. Sprengel and Busch 2011; Bottcher and Muller 2013), 
ethical considerations and societal pressures are also factors leading organizations down this path 
(e.g. Hrasky 2012; Besio and Pronzini 2014). For others, participation is linked to a desire to 
influence policy and regulations (e.g. Haigh 2008).  
 
As international policy responses to climate change evolve, participation in the voluntary 
carbon market (VCM) has become a preferred option for organizations looking to offset their 
carbon emissions, and a growing literature has developed around this subject (e.g. Birchall, 
Murphy and Milne 2015; Gray 2014; Kollmuss and Lazarus 2011). At its root, the VCM offers 
organizations (as well as individuals) the opportunity to reduce emissions without the restrictions 
of a regulatory framework. However, skepticism exists around whether voluntary carbon trading 
on its own (without compliance or a cap, for example) can result in absolute emission reductions 
(e.g. Wittneben, Okereke, Banerjee and Levy 2012). i  Further, as scholarship suggests, 
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organizational support for voluntary carbon trading may simply be in an effort to stave off stricter 
compulsory measures by government (e.g. Birchall et al 2015). 
 
 Although certain aspects of the VCM have previously been explored, there is a gap in the 
academic literature with regard to which institutions emerged early on, how they were created, and 
what influence actors had in shaping and sustaining these new institutions (See Knox-Hayes (2010) 
for an exception). This research endeavors to narrow this gap. Through critical investigation at the 
organizational and field levels, the objective of this empirical study is to better understand the 
institutions that developed in the early stages of New Zealand’s VCM, the cognitions and actions 
involved, how and by whom they were shaped, and what effect they had on participants. 
 
 Until recently, New Zealand’s approach to climate change mitigation included aspiration 
for a carbon neutral public sector (Birchall et al. 2013) and a regulated emissions trading scheme. 
After a shift in government in 2008 (from Clark’s Labour-led to Key’s National-led government), 
however, plans for carbon neutrality were abandoned and full implementation of the emissions 
trading scheme were delayed (e.g. Birchall 2014). As a result of the precarious position with regard 
to potential carbon regulations, organizations in New Zealand were drawn to the VCM.  
 
New Zealand offers a particularly interesting context in which to examine a VCM that has 
been relatively unexplored: During the early phase of the VCM, New Zealand had the 3rd highest 
increase in emissions from 1990 levels of development countries (MfE 2009); New Zealand is 
physically small in size and geographically isolated. Along with aspirations to do its ‘fair share’ 
for climate change mitigation, these physical characteristics, provide unique well-defined and 
 CM 2017 
 6 
manageable boundaries to explore the entire range of consumption, production and services related 
to a carbon market.  
 
Given the gravity of the climate change problem, it is important to explore the institutional 
frameworks surrounding New Zealand’s VCM, as these can provide insight into participant 




 In order to shed light on the institutions that emerged in the early phase of New Zealand’s 
VCM, an inductive approach was adopted for this study. To gather rich, context  specific 
narratives, qualitative semi-structured interviews were carried out with managers and decision-
makers from organizations and industries most associated with carbon neutrality in New Zealand 
at the time. Participants were investigated regarding their cognitions as well as their operational 
activities and interactions with a range of actors in the emerging field, and how these evolved over 
time. Interview questions were formulated to provide insight into the nature of emergent 
institutions in general (e.g. rules, norms, beliefs), and to identify perspectives and opinions on 
climate change strategies, carbon neutrality, offsetting and the interviewee’s organization’s 
involvement with the VCM in particular. A general interview outline followed four basic points:  
(1) How did your organization first become involved with climate change, carbon 
neutrality, and buying/ selling offsets? 
(2) How did you decide on the particular approach to adopt? How has your approach 
evolved over time?  
(3) What accomplishments and setbacks have you encountered? What has worked and 
what would you have done differently? 
(4) Where do you see the VCM and climate change strategies in general headed in the near 
and more distant future? 
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 At the time the study took place (2010-2011), 221 New Zealand organizations were 
identified in the field. The organizations chosen for this study represent a cross-section of 
offset buyers and sellers, as well as middlemen involved in early stages of the market: 2 
certifiers, 2 consultants, 1 registry, 1 auditor, 3 CarboNZero certified, 1 carbon neutral non-
certified, 1 looking into becoming carbon neutral, and 2 CEMARS certified (see Birchall et al 
(2015) for a discussion of these programs). The wine industry and the taxi industry were chosen 
for case studies. Both of these industries include organizations that prominently advertise 
themselves as carbon neutral and were among companies most associated with carbon neutrality 
in New Zealand.ii The carbon services industry was also studied. This new industry rapidly 
evolved and expanded to fill any perceived needs associated with the carbon market, and 
provided an infrastructure of skills for organizational climate change actions and emissions 
trading.  
 
 A senior manager or relevant environmental personnel at each selected organization was 
interviewed. The interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2011, and included 14 interviewees 
at 13 organizations for a total of 20 hours of interviews (Table 1). Digital recordings of the 
interviews were transcribed by a professional service. Transcripts were thoroughly examined, 
broken down into topics, ideas, or quotes and then organized into themes for analysis. Immediately 
after each interview, a brief summary was put together of initial thoughts and potentially important 
themes and ideas brought up by the interviewee. These preliminary thoughts and themes were 
taken into account during a re-examination of the transcripts to ensure that no initial impressions 
were overlooked.iii 
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Table 1. Interviews by industry 
<Insert table near here> 
 
Findings and Discussion 
 Findings are presented here in three sections, which represent the three case studies: the 
wine industry; the taxi industry; and, the carbon service industry. Each section details the major 
themes that emerged in the interviews, and provides a discussion that relates to the research 
objectives: 
The wine industry 
• Sustainability and marketplace motivations 
• Measure, manage, improve 
• Offsets 
 
The taxi industry 
• Conformity and radical differentiation 
• Business case for environmental action 
• Offsets 
 
The carbon services industry 
• Emergence of a new field 
• Business opportunities 
• Setting the rules, assuring market integrity 
 
The wine industry 
The wine industry in New Zealand has a longstanding tradition with sustainability. As 
grape growers, the industry has a direct relationship with the natural environment; wine grapes are 
among crops most susceptible to shifts in climate (Downey, Dokoozlian and Krstic 2006).  As 
scholarship suggests, key wine-producing regions will experience increases in temperature and 
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extreme variability in rain, ultimately stressing the industry (e.g. Fenner 2009; Jones, White, 
Cooper and Storchmann 2005).  
 
Recognizing their vulnerability to climate variability, wineries were among the first 
business organizations in New Zealand to become involved with carbon neutrality. Three New 
Zealand wineries were investigated in this study: one CarboNZero certified, one aspiring to 
become carbon neutral and just starting to look into options on how to achieve this goal, and one 
that decided against carbon neutrality but is measuring and attempting to reduce its GHG 
emissions.  
 
Sustainability and marketplace motivations 
 Sustainability is considered essential for survival of the wine industry (Galbreath 2011). 
This is echoed in the findings, where sustainability was found to be embedded in organizational 
activities. This was found to be true for the industry in general, where sustainability is 
institutionalized, with well-defined norms and practices regarding environmental responsibility.iv 
 
 Further, although competition and differentiation are part and parcel of the industry, there 
was an underlying sense that New Zealand wineries are all in it together. To this point, 
collaboration is encouraged, with industry seminars common practice. Networking, not only with 
potential customers but also with other wineries, had become integral in promoting the sharing of 
ideas. 
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 Given the industry’s inclination toward environmentally friendly practices, and with the 
institutional foundations already in place, attention to climate change and carbon emissions 
management was considered a logical next step. 
 
 In line with industry buy-in for better control on emissions, customers were found to be a 
further catalyst for action. As noted in the literature (e.g. Besio and Pronzini 2014), customers have 
a growing awareness of climate change, which often translates into changing expectations 
regarding businesses’ environmental actions. 
 
 New Zealand wineries aim to serve the high-end market. As a result, and in line with 
scholarship in this area (e.g. Cohen and Vandenbergh 2012), environmental certification was 
viewed by producers as a way to stay competitive in the marketplace. 
 
 However, challenges persisted. The food miles debate and buy-local advertising, for 
example, had put a cloud over New Zealand exports distant from their trade market. While this is 
not a concern unique to New Zealand, it is particularly poignant in New Zealand given it’s distance 
from global markets (e.g. Stancu and Smith 2006). The wineries realized that they ignore that 
debate at their peril. 
 
 For Wine 1 (Table 1), carbon neutrality was ‘a means of negating those claims for food 
miles’ by accounting for and offsetting all emissions as far as the destination port. But for non-
exporters the push for action was not as strong. In the domestic market the majority of customers’ 
indifference was not providing enough incentive to change. For some the motivation for mitigation 
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was found to be primarily financial rather than purely environmental, and thus the costs were seen 
to outweigh the market value of becoming carbon neutral. 
 
 For others, environmental certification was a vital part of their business strategy: ‘We see 
it as a marketing imperative for a company with our ethos’ (Table 1, Wine 1). Yet certification 
does come at a cost, with certifiers charging a royalty to put their brand on bottle labels. This risk 
was found to be compounded by doubt regarding the value of such labelling because of widespread 
ignorance regarding the meaning of the various certifications among consumers.v 
 
 While studies suggest that consumers are interested in labeling around low-carbon products 
(e.g. Li, Long and Chen 2017), the seeming confusion and low logo recognition for carbon neutral 
certifications, was not a promising sign for organizational uptake and propagation of the 
certifications in New Zealand’s wine industry.  
 
Measure, manage, improve 
 Emissions measurement is considered the first step toward emissions reductions. This was 
confirmed in the interviews with all three interviewees mentioning the importance of measurement 
while describing their approach to emissions management.  
 
 Quantification was held to be an ongoing process in order to evaluate attempts to reduce 
emissions. Knowing the largest sources of emissions helps to determine and prioritize actions to 
be taken. 
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 However, there was a perceived limit to control over emissions sources. For example, 
packaging and refrigeration are major sources of emissions in the industry (e.g. Colman and Paster 
2009).vi Both of these sources are considered outside of the winery’s control: packaging is obtained 
from an external supplier and loss of refrigerant gases is deemed unavoidable given the current 
technology available. This apparent inability to affect change was found to be a barrier to 
organizational emissions reductions. 
 
 Nonetheless, there is potential to reduce emissions by influencing the supply chain (e.g. 
Blass and Corbett 2017; Plambeck 2012); both Wine 1 (Table 1) and Wine 3 (Table 1) noted that 
they were able to achieve significant intensity reductions by pressuring their supplier to reduce 
glass bottle weights. Although there are win-win benefits to reducing emissions (for example, 
reducing the amount of glass per bottle consequently reduces the cost of packaging), the required 
initial financial and/or personnel-based investments were seen as obstacles to climate change 
actions. 
 
 Certification and audit systems with specified goals of continual improvement add 
accountability and provide further motivation by enforcing a certain level of action. Wine 3 (Table 
1) described how their previous experience with both effective and ineffective audit systems 
affected their climate change strategy and reinforced their decision to adopt certification and 
continual emission audits: 
Having a one off energy audit didn’t work because there was no follow-up; We already knew from other 
audit systems we have in place based on continual improvement that once you have a certification and you 
have an independent audit you actually have people that are motivated to do something about it and that 
becomes part of the organization.  
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When systems become part of the organization, actions are enforced all the way down the chain 
of command.  
 
Offsets 
 Given the controversy surrounding offsets (e.g. Spash 2010; Milne and Grubnic 2011), 
transparency and legitimacy are key to organizational emissions offsetting practices. Reforestation 
offsets were considered the most credible and easiest for the end consumer to understand. 
 
 Co-benefits to the general ecosystem also made reforestation offsets attractive. Moreover, 
inline with the literature (e.g. Balderas Torres et al 2015), local based credits were generally 
preferred as they are seen to benefit the community and are often perceived as more legitimate.vii 
Sourcing credits locally can also be mutually beneficial for the buyer and the seller: ‘We knew the 
farmer that was selling these credits, so it was that relationship; he’d tell our story - we’d tell his 
story’ (Table 1, Wine 1). However, other considerations such as price and availability also factored 
into the equation. 
 
 The three wineries examined had very different relationships with offsetting: Wine 1 had 
purchased offsets for several years and planed to continue along this route, Wine 2 was looking 
into purchasing offsets, and Wine 3 had decided against it. The perceived variance in legitimacy 
of the approaches affected their choice of actions. As the literature suggests, offset policies are in 
need of reform in order to ensure that sequestration projects achieve real and additional carbon 
removals (e.g. Galatowitsch 2009). 
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 For Wine 2 (Table 1) offsetting was viewed as ‘probably a useful alternative to nothing’, 
that is to doing nothing. They were deciding between going with an established program or doing 
it themselves. Balancing financial/ market volatility versus legitimacy considerations was central 
in their decision making process. 
 
The taxi industry 
 Taxi companies in New Zealand were among business organizations most linked to urban 
pollution, greenhouse-gas emissions, and fossil-fuel usage. The industry shake-up with the hybrid 
vehicle movement provides an interesting case study. Taxis have become among companies most 
associated with carbon neutrality in New Zealand, in part due to their highly visible street presence 
and advertising. Three New Zealand taxi companies were investigated. All three advertised 
themselves as carbon neutral; one was self-proclaimed carbon neutral while the other two were 
CarboNZero certified.  
 
Conformity and radical differentiation 
 The taxi industry in New Zealand is a mature industry which had, until 20 years ago, been 
highly regulated by the Government, leaving a legacy of prescribed actions. This meant ‘you don’t 
need to have a customer focus, that disappears because you’ve got a captured market’ (Table 1, 
Taxi 3, Y1, R1). The mature and settled nature of the industry resulted in conformity and 
uniformity. 
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 Because the taxi industry is considered inherently polluting (Mourato, Saynor and Hart 
2004), shifting towards new (green) technologies can challenge business-as-usual (Calza, 
Parmentola and Tutore 2017). Within New Zealand’s taxi industry, the combustion engine was the 
norm and so even when new technology became available there was hesitance to venture into 
unchartered territories. Taxi companies’ unique organizational structure with drivers essentially 
operating their own business made it particularly challenging to impose new measures. 
 
 In New Zealand, the greatest barrier for established taxi companies to adopt climate change 
actions was ‘overcoming objections from operators within the company itself’ (Table 1, Taxi 2). 
This is apparent elsewhere in the literature, where Gao and Kitirattragarn (2008), for example, 
highlight operator age, experience and income as limiting factors in shifting to hybrid electric 
vehicles.    
 
 Driver buy-in is essential. But, the polluting nature of the industry made it seem 
incompatible with environmental actions. Climate change actions and hybrid vehicles were 
initially seen as a fad and mocked. However, industry pressures would later provide a platform for 
a step change within the industry and pave the way for the hybrid movement.  
 
 Green Cabs was the first carbon neutral taxi company in New Zealand. An industry 
outsider, Green Cabs was a rarity in the stagnant taxi industry. This entrepreneurial spirit is evident 
in the literature (e.g. Dargusch and Griffiths 2014), with proactive organizations pushing 
innovation on climate change action. Unconstrained by typical industry logics, the company 
sought radical differentiation rather than conformity. Not only did Green Cabs establish a hybrid-
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only fleet, the taxis were painted bright green. Some in the industry saw this as ‘gimmicky’, but 
the bold new marketing worked, as admitted by their chief competitor: 
Green Cabs came out and they, to be quite honest, pretty much rocked us to the core. They were much smaller 
but they were getting a lot of business. That was a good marketing ploy on their behalf. (Table 1, Taxi 2) 
  
The company also benefited from good timing, launching in late 2007 when a lot of media 
attention in New Zealand was being paid to climate change, in particular since Government had 
implemented the Carbon Neutral Public Service program to cut government departments’ GHG 
emissions (Birchall et al 2013; Birchall 2014).  
 
 Using Green Cabs was an easy and visible way for organizations and individuals to show 
that they were doing something for the environment. With that said, the taxi industry’s tradition of 
conformity led to innovations being met with resistance. Unlike the wine industry where 
collaboration was favoured, competitors in the taxi industry tried to discredit novel actions. 
Although some taxi companies had already gradually and quietly started using hybrid technology, 
the sudden initial success of Green Cabs legitimized and sped-up the uptake of environmentally 
friendly actions. 
 
Business case for environmental action  
 The rise of Green Cabs forced other taxi companies to take notice. Mobilization was 
necessary to maintain a competitive edge in the changing marketplace. For Taxi 2 (Table 1), 
becoming carbon neutral certified was “marketing, a business concept” to counter the arrival of 
the new green company. Scholars echo this logic, indicating that climate action is increasingly 
considered a competitive advantage (e.g. Sullivan and Gouldson 2013; Spremgel and Buscg 2011). 
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In the taxi industry, the business case for moving beyond the comfort of conformity had been 
established, and whereas previously environmental actions had been mocked within the industry, 
they became legitimized and accepted as a means of competitive business practice. 
 
 Investing in a hybrid vehicle was rationalized on an economic basis with the initial higher 
price counterbalanced by fuel savings. Taxi 1 (Table 1) explained to potential drivers who worried 
about affording the hybrid cars needed to join his company that ‘the petrol savings alone would 
pay for the vehicle over the life of the car.’ This rationale was strengthened year on year as the 
price of the technology dropped and the price of petrol increased. The number of kilometres one 
puts on a vehicle is another key contributing factor in determining cost efficiency. In this respect, 
Graham-Rowe, Gardner, Abraham, Skippon, Dittmar, Hutchins and Stannard (2012) highlight that 
low mileage usage may prove more costly, given the initial purchase cost and ongoing 
maintenance. 
 
 Customers’ predominantly positive reaction to hybrids has softened the widely held notion 
that only larger vehicles work successfully as taxis. Attracting customers and gaining a marketing 
advantage further strengthened the business case. Positive word-of-mouth from early adopters 
influenced other drivers to come on board. As hybrids gained more visibility in the industry, they 
became not just a viable option but a preferred one. Further, since companies already had vehicle 
replacement policies which specified that vehicles need to be replaced every six to 10 years, 
modification of this policy to restrict the types of new vehicles allowed in the fleet could force a 
shift away from the standard petrol cars and greatly reduce GHG emissions. 
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Offsets 
 Carbon neutrality and environmental claims involve deviating from accepted industry 
norms and thus are frequently subject to skepticism and scrutiny. All three interviewees mentioned 
either dealing directly with investigations by the Commerce Commission (Taxi 1 and Taxi 2) or 
concerns surrounding greenwash (Taxi 3). For Taxi 2 and Taxi 3, certification was seen as way to 
validate environmental actions. The guidelines, prescribed actions and third party verification 
involved in the certification process was found to alleviate credibility concerns. 
 
 Taxi 1, on the other hand, believed that those processes were unnecessary, ‘an extra series 
of steps just so that you fit in’.  Taxi 1 (Table 1) chose to forego certification and simply planted 
trees. 
 
 Further, apprehensiveness often arises from the emissions’ offsetting portion of carbon 
neutrality. A main concern among the interviewees was that offsetting is used as a façade to avoid 
taking personal responsibility. This is echoed in the literature as well, where Mackerron et al. 
(2009) liken offsets to religious indulgences - a means to compensate for ones sins. Moreover, 
offsets also have the inherent risk of perpetuating a business-as-usual mentality, where net 
emissions fail to decrease (e.g. Harding and Rapson 2014). 
 
 As for credits, Taxi 2 and Taxi 3 indicated a preference for local credits (though cost and 
availability also factored into their decision), while Taxi 1 invested in projects in developing 
countries. Taxi 1 held that these projects would more cost effectively help the environment. All 
three companies supported their position and interests by trying to discredit the other side.  
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The carbon services industry 
 New Zealand’s carbon services industry emerged in conjunction with the carbon market. 
Unlike in other carbon markets (in China for instance), where key institutional expertise was 
lacking from the outset (e.g. Lo and Yu 2015), New Zealand’s carbon services industry rapidly 
evolved and expanded to fill any perceived needs associated with the market. Consultants, 
certifiers and auditors provided an infrastructure of skills for organizational climate change actions 
and emissions trading. In the voluntary market in particular, where rules are undefined, these actors 
occupied a critical position by advising their clients and thus influencing emerging norms and 
practices (Birchall et al 2015). Two carbon neutral certifiers, two consultants, one auditor, and one 
offset registry were included in this study.  
 
Emergence of a new field 
 Organizations are increasingly exploring ways to manage their ecological impact while  
maintaining economic success (e.g. Rankin et al 2011). The creation of a carbon market 
commoditized environmental protection actions by attributing a tangible commercial value to 
GHG emissions. Institutional factors for the carbon services industry that developed to support the 
market resulted from a blending of existing logics put to a new problem: climate change. This was 
evidenced by how the service providers described becoming involved in this nascent field. For 
example, Consultant 1 owned a wilderness park and had a longstanding interest in nature 
restoration. The carbon market opened up new financial avenues for reforestation and thus 
Consultant 1 became involved in providing reforestation offsets and related consulting services.  
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 Consultant 2 also aligned their environmental and forestry background to the problem of 
climate change, working as a project developer, educator, and policy specialist. Consultant 2 
(Table 1) developed forest conservation projects in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands after 
finding a need and an opportunity to use the market as an incentivizing tool. Likewise, Certifier 1 
started from an environmental perspective and then turned it into a commercial opportunity. 
Certifier 2 came at climate change from a highly successful entrepreneurial background, and was 
drawn to start a business in carbon trading because environmental actions associated with the 
carbon market seemed to be the next high growth industry. 
 
 In contrast, the founders of Registry 1 had no previous experience in the environmental 
industry or in markets, but they did have extensive business and executive experience. The registry 
was started for ‘purely business and commercial reasons’ (Table 1, Registry 1). They endeavored 
to fill a structural hole found in the emerging carbon market (XXXX 2016); infrastructure was 
needed to assure market integrity and give participants confidence in the marketplace. Auditor 1 
similarly assured the integrity of climate change actions and claims. As a major accounting firm, 
they provided professional services to businesses. The firm’s services evolved to support the 
changing needs of their clients, in this case creating a sustainability and climate change practice.  
 
Business opportunities 
 As evidenced in business and organization literature in general (e.g. Knox-Hayes 2010), 
business logics were a central pillar for organizations to enter New Zealand’s carbon services 
industry. The business case was discussed by interviewees not only in relation to their own 
activities, but also in relation to gaining buy-in from a spectrum of potential actors in the field. 
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Business logics were used to promote services to clients. Similar to the taxi industry, where the 
business case rather than the fear of climate change was presented to gain driver buy-in, carbon 
service providers focused on the opportunities and liabilities associated with carbon to gain clients. 
 
 Changing behavior is largely dependent on the associated financial implications (e.g. 
Okereke and Russel 2010).viii Pricing carbon or energy savings into investment decisions (for 
example whether or not to adopt clean technology) can drive change by altering the dynamics of 
marginal cost curves. However, policy changes and the resulting uncertainty in the market 
complicate these decisions. The volatility of the market and subsequent crash of the carbon price 
had the opposite of the desired market effect: actions were disincentivized.  
 
 The business case for taking climate change actions goes beyond strictly immediate 
financial implications. There was also a belief among the interviewees that organizations 
demonstrating environmental responsibility are more successful than their competitors.  
 
Setting the rules, assuring market integrity 
 Ensuring and assuring integrity of the market was mentioned by interviewees as a way to 
limit liabilities and mitigate risks. As Auditor 1 noted, the challenge with voluntary markets is that 
‘the road map isn’t as prescriptive’ (Auditor 1). Many of the interviewees talked about ‘carbon 
cowboys’ or ‘sharks’ taking advantage of the system. Indeed, this is evident in organization/ 
business scholarship in general, where it has been shown that the lack of defined rules opens 
voluntary markets to abuse (e.g. Dhanda and Hartman 2011). Establishing rules thus helps to give 
confidence in the market. 
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 However, what constitutes quality and what rules are needed to ensure integrity of the 
carbon market is hotly debated. The interviewees highlighted a number of critical concepts (e.g. 
additionality; permanence; double counting of offsets; standards and rules) that were commonly 
debated. As with the literature in this area (Mackerron et al 2009), many of the interviewees had 
strongly held, often opposing, views on these issues. 
 
 Additionality, for example, is widely accepted as a prerequisite for creating carbon credits 
and is included as a requirement in all major standards. All of the interviewees mentioned the 
concept and only one questioned its validity. Consultant 1 argued that it penalized people for their 
initiative; early movers should be able to get carbon finance to maintain their activities. 
 
 Two interviewees, Consultant 1 and Energy 1, were directly involved in creating and 
selling offsets. And although their projects passed additionality tests and their offsets were 
purchased by reputable organizations, both acknowledged that their activities likely would have 
occurred without financing from the carbon market. For example, the forest regeneration project 
by Consultant 1 had slowly begun prior to carbon financing and likely would have continued, 
albeit at a slower pace. The wind farm projects by Energy 1 (Table 1) were self-admittedly ‘on the 
cusp’ of the eligibility criteria to gain revenue from carbon credits; similar projects by the company 
had since gone ahead without the extra revenue stream. Thus, even if additionality is viewed as a 
requirement, the criteria may not be stringent enough to weed out projects that would have 
occurred anyway.  
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 Permanence was another contentious issue, particularly in the forestry sector. This is clear 
in the scholarship as well, Chia, Fobissie and Kanninen (2016) for instance, note the importance 
of considering ecosystem health, potential of future logging and forest fires. Some projects were 
found to have complex insurance strategies and buffers to manage these risks and assure integrity 
of the protected carbon stocks. Consultant 2 and Certifier 1 both described using buffer zones 
where sequestration activities were not sold as offsets but instead were used as insurance to cover 
liabilities in the event of damage to the offsets carbon stocks. Consultant 1 (Table 1), on the other 
hand, believed that despite the best of intentions, no long-term assurances could be made. 
 
 Auditor 1, Certifier 1, and Registry 1 expressed more confidence in offsets based on 
renewable energy projects than forestry projects due to the issues surrounding non-permanence 
risks. These three organizations were heavily involved in assuring the integrity of the market and 
had a direct stake in managing associated reputational risks. Auditor 1 (Table 1) noted that they 
wouldn’t want to be ‘tainted’ with bad offsets, while Registry 1 (Table 1) understood that to 
maintain integrity ‘you’ve got to be squeaky clean’. These organizations were thus very cautious 
about what offsets they would accept.  
 
 As for the issue of double counting, can there even be a legitimate voluntary market in a 
country bound by Kyoto compliance? Or, are voluntary reductions already counted in the country’s 
national inventory and thus any claims or credits in a voluntary market would amount to double 
counting? Interviewees had varied views on how this concern should be addressed. Laws in New 
Zealand effectively block the creation of voluntary carbon credits after 2008 when Kyoto came 
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into effect. However, Consultant 1 took the stand that the carbon rights on his property were his to 
do with as he pleased. 
 
 The issue of double counting is not only a concern for offset sellers, but also for offset 
buyers and organizations making carbon neutral claims. Auditor 1 (Table 1) questioned the 
credibility of organizational offsetting within an expanding regulatory market. Certifier 1 whose 
business was centred on a voluntary program disagreed and reasoned that voluntary action, even 
if there is double counting, is better than no action.  
 
 One of the key ways in which the VCM differs from the compliance market relates to the  
legitimacy of the carbon offset or emission reduction. While the latter gains legitimacy through 
regulation and legislation, the former relies largely on standards. The carbon services industry 
played a critical role in crafting standards and programs, and thus shaping the rules and norms 
New Zealand’s emerging VCM (Birchall et al 2015). For example, Registry 1 (Table 1) indicated 
that they listed credits for nine internationally-recognized voluntary standards and were actively 
involved in the development of the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS).ix Although there was 
widespread use of standards, the interpretation of the rules was largely inconsistent. Therefore, 
standards were frequently used by service providers in combination with in-house guidelines. 
Programs are often more prescriptive than standards. Service providers, such as certifiers, would 
set rules that their clients must adhere to in a consistent way, removing any room for 
(mis)interpretation. 
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 Over time, these rules became stricter and more consistent. For example, although Certifier 
1 had always required their clients to have an emissions reduction plan, they added rules in 2009 
requiring achievement of reductions in order to stay in the program. Their clients reacted positively 
to this change. However, they also cautioned about adding too many rules. 
 
 There is a fine balance between stringency required to ensure integrity and practicality. 
Certifier 2 used the same standards as other certifiers but viewed their program as an option that 
was ‘cheaper and less onerous to deal with, more commercially focused, rather than heavy handed’ 
(Table 1, Certifier 2). Yet, Certifier 1, with a more complex bureaucratic process, held the 
dominant position in the marketplace. Organizations were likely responding to the legitimacy 
associated with Certifier 1. 
 
Conclusions 
 When this study began in 2010, the New Zealand VCM was an emerging organizational 
field. It is thus not surprising that organizations participating in the early market, whether as offset 
buyers or sellers, or middlemen providing structure to the market, had a range of experiences. 
Importantly, the findings identify a number of early successes, including endeavors which focused 
on promoting market integrity through infrastructure (e.g. a registry, certification programs), as 
exemplified by Registry 1 and Certifier 1; and, knowledge sharing amongst participants, which 
influenced others to shift behavior around climate change mitigation in general. 
 
 Nevertheless, disenchantment with the emerging carbon market itself were evident. 
Organizations also drifted away from buying carbon credits. Registry 1 laid some of the blame on 
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the media. Certifier 2 further explained that scrutiny of climate change actions discouraged 
organizations from getting involved with the carbon market; the risks outweighed the benefits. 
 
 Another major impediment identified by interviewees was the global financial crisis. 
Uncertainty and divisive politics surrounding future Government policies further aggravated 
organizational wariness to take action. Political support at the level of New Zealand society as a 
whole had recently melted.  
 
  The importance of this research is linked to the urgency of the climate change problem. 
While this study provides insight into the early stages of the VCM, the state of the market in New 
Zealand has indeed changed since the study occurred. For example, mitigative approaches, such 
as hybrid vehicles, have become more attractive (e.g. Nilsson and Nykvist 2016) and the trend in 
carbon offsets cost has decreased markedly (e.g. Mundaca and Richter 2013; Richter and 
Chambers 2014).x  
 
In parallel, the global trend in carbon offsets traded has varied since New Zealand’s 
voluntary program began, with a global peak around 2010, following with a decline. While it is 
difficult to pinpoint a direct cause for the decline, insight may be gained by exploring the nature 
of supply and demand, as well as the relationship between the voluntary and compliance carbon 
markets (e.g. Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace 2017). In New Zealand, while obligations 
associated the ETS remain transitional (and unclear), decision-makers may further appreciate the 
VCM as another tool in the box to help abate New Zealand’s increasing GHG emissions. Indeed, 
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thanks to global support of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the voluntary market may begin to 
experience a boost in general.xi  
 
Through critical investigation at the organizational and field levels, this paper explores the 
successes and challenges participants experienced in the early stage of New Zealand’s VCM. 
While further research is necessary to assess how the institutional field has evolved through time,xii 
insights gained by this study can shed light on the nuances of market participation in general, as 
well as help policy-makers and stakeholders better understand the market’s (in)ability to facilitate 
a low-carbon economy in New Zealand. Moreover, though it is not assumed that findings can be 
generalized beyond the New Zealand context, this study nonetheless offers a comparative 
reference point for organizations in other countries seeking to engage or shape a VCM. 
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Notes 
i With the exception of the Chicago Climate Exchange, VCMs tend to lack emissions reduction targets, government 
imposed or otherwise. 
ii The prominence of the wine and taxi industries in New Zealand’s VCM was established through a survey 
question, as part of the initial phase of this research program, that asked respondents to list organizations that they 
most associate with carbon neutrality. The total achieved survey response rate was 47% (137 respondents) and 32% 
(105 respondents) in 2010 and 2011, respectively (see Birchall et al (2016)). 
iii See Birchall (2016) for a more detailed discussion about the study’s approach. 
iv Sustainable Winegrowing New Zealand (SWNZ), created in the mid-90s to provide guidance on sustainable 
management of vineyards and wineries, is now adhered to almost universally. 
v See Kollmuss, Lee and Lazarus (2014) for a discussion on the offset and credit process. 
vi See Coley, Howard and Winter (2009) for an interesting discussion on carbon emissions associated with local food 
distribution methods. 
vii See van der Gaast, Sikkema and Vochrer (2016) for a discussion surrounding improvements to accounting around 
forest carbon credits. 
viii See Boiral, Henri and Talbot (2012) for an interesting discussion that runs counter this claim. 
ix The Greenhouse Gas Protocol and ISO 14064 for measuring and reporting emissions, and the Gold Standard and 
the VCS for creating offsets were the most commonly used standards mentioned by the interviewees. 
x See Shafiei, Leaver and Davidsdottir (2017) for a simulation-based discussion on incentives for low carbon 
emission vehicles. 
xi However, as the cost of New Zealand units remain higher than international units, this may nevertheless remain a 
challenge New Zealand. For a discussion on New Zealand’s ETS post Kyoto delinking, see Ormsby and Kerr 
(2016). 
xii While this study focuses on the early stages of the VCM in New Zealand, a follow-up study is in development to 
provide a longitudinal dimension. 
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